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Abstract 
This paper provides a comprehensive review of the literature on the governance of 
international joint ventures (IJVs). Through focusing on IJV boards and top teams, 
examination of the current debate regarding the IJV director’s contribution to board 
performance and effectiveness is undertaken and, in so doing, directions for future research 
are identified. The literature review reveals that little consideration has been paid by 
researchers to the work of the IJV board and the role and contribution of IJV board directors 
to board effectiveness. Further, it is concluded that current understanding of IJV board 
functioning and the ways in which directors of IJV boards contribute to board effectiveness 
remains incomplete. Apart from highlighting the need for further study into the role and 
contribution of IJV board directors to board effectiveness, the paper suggests ways in which 
IJV director contribution and performance could be explored further.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The nature of effective board functioning and the role of board directors have been considered 
as being among the most important areas of management research (Forbes and Milliken, 1999). 
Such concerns have been examined in the corporate governance literature highlighting the 
importance of board effectiveness in terms of the success of a company and the role that each 
board director plays in contributing to effective board and organisational performance (Renton, 
1999). Developing a shared vision for the future of the company, enhancing quality 
relationships and establishing clear and open communication between board members are 
considered as particularly important indicators of a high performing board (Coulson-Thomas, 
1991; Willcocks, 1994; Renton, 1999; Westphal, 1999; Carpenter and Westphal, 2001). 
Concern over board performance and effectiveness is reinforced in the context of international 
joint ventures (IJVs). IJVs are viewed as hybrid configurations and due to the particular 
challenges in managing such entities, it has been argued that board directors play a crucial role 
in IJV development (Child, 1998). IJV partners’ representation on the joint venture entity 
board of directors is not only reflective of the equity ownership of the organisation (Killing, 
1983; Schaan, 1988; Kumar and Seth, 1998; Sharma, 1998; Carver, 2000), but also acts as a 
mechanism for representing partners interests and ensuring positive relationships on the board 
(Satow and Wang, 1994; Doz and Hamel, 1998; Garrow et al, 2000), both viewed as 
preconditions for IJV success (Beamish and Banks, 1987; Inkpen, 1995; Antoniou and 
Whitman, 1998; Wang et al., 1999).  
 
Numerous studies emphasise the importance of board director contribution to the success of an 
IJV (Carver, 2000). However, it is viewed that insufficient attention in the IJV field has 
focused on IJV boards from the perspective of the role and contribution of individual directors. 
Thus, in considering IJV board dynamics and the ways in which directors of IJV boards 
contribute to board effectiveness, this paper provides a comprehensive review of the literature 
on IJV governance, with particular focus on IJV boards and top teams. Attention is given to 
studies that directly concentrate on an IJV director’s role in order to reveal empirical evidence 
regarding the IJV board director’s contribution to board and organisational performance. The 
paper concludes by identifying further avenues of research covering IJV board and director 
role and contribution and how such research can be pursued. 
 2
 
IJV BOARDS  
 
The focus of this review of the IJV literature concentrates on studies that highlight IJV board 
roles, composition and dynamics, the latter including IJV board decision-making issues, 
boardroom agendas, frequency of board meetings, as well as the impact of the national and 
organisational culture on IJV directors contribution to board performance. Two studies in 
particular (Bjorkman, 1995; Goodall and Warner, 2002) focus on IJV board relations (Table 1) 
from the perspective of corporate governance considerations in Sino-foreign IJVs. The research 
by Bjorkman (1995) takes an expatriate (Western partner’s) perspective where board data is 
collected from senior managers who were affected by board decisions, rather than from board 
members. In contrast Goodall and Warner’s (2002) research is one of the first to shed light on 
IJV board processes from the perspective of senior Chinese managers experience of IJV board 
interactions and decision outcomes. 
 
Other studies, presented in Table 1, draw heavily on the literature concerning IJV control and 
inter-partner relationships. The former treaties mainly consider board/top team composition as 
a control mechanism, whereas the latter group study the IJV top team issues and dynamics 
from a variety of perspectives. However, none of these studies focus on IJV board behaviour 
and strategic decision processes but rather consider the structural dimensions of boards.  
Consequently, most empirical studies in the IJV literature provide scant information on IJV 
board roles, composition, characteristics and dynamics. Thus IJV board size, director tenure, as 
well as the frequency of IJV board meetings, IJV boardroom agendas and board decision-
making issues remain virtually unexplored. Slightly greater attention is paid to IJV top 
management team (TMT) issues and processes, such as communication and decision-making 
processes that impact on the functioning of boards and TMTs in IJVs (Pearce, 1997; Li et al, 
1999; Hambrick et al, 2001) and by implication shed light on appropriate IJV director 
behaviour (Li et al, 2002). 
 
 
 Table 1: Summary of Selected Literature on IJV Boards/Top Teams 
AUTHORS FOCUS/AREAS REFERRED TO NATURE 
OF THE 
STUDY 
APPROACH  
 IJV 
Board 
Roles 
IJV Board 
Composition  
IJV Board 
as a 
Control 
Mechanism 
IJV Board 
Director’s 
Tenure 
IJV Board 
Size 
Frequency of 
IJV Board 
Meetings 
IJV Boardroom 
Agendas 
IJV Board 
Decision-
Making  
IJV Top Team 
Processes and 
Issues 
  
As-Saber et 
al, 1998 
 x        Qualitative/ 
quantitative 
Case study of 9 Australian/Indian IJVs; interviews with 
senior managers 
Bjorkman and 
Lu, 1999 
  x       Qualitative Interviews with foreign and local managers (mainly GM 
or HR managers) of 65 Sino/Western IJVs 
Bjorkman, 
1995 
x  x x    x  Qualitative/ 
quantitative 
Interviews with senior managers (expatriates in China) in 
33 Sino/Western IJVs  
Chalos, 1998  x        Qualitative Case study of 4 Sino/US IJVs; interviews with both US 
and Chinese managers plus archival data 
Child and 
Yan, 1999 
 x x       Qualitative/ 
quantitative 
67 Sino/foreign IJVs; interviews with GMs, Deputy GMs 
and heads of functions 
Daniels and 
Magill, 1993 
x  x   x    Qualitative 9 interviews with managers with direct responsibility for 
their companies; 11 US/Asia-pacific IJVs 
Garrow et al, 
2000 
 x      x x Qualitative Case studies of 9 strategic alliances, including 4 IJVs; 
interviews with executive and middle managers and 
employees  
Geringer and 
Frayne, 1990 
  x       Conceptual Review, analysis and model building 
Geringer and 
Hebert, 1989 
  x       Conceptual Review, analysis and model building 
Geringer and 
Hebert, 1991 
  x       Quantitative Two related studies in the US and Canada, using 
questionnaires and semi-structured interviews with GMs 
and executives from 69 and 48 IJVs respectively 
Geringer, 
1993 
  x       Conceptual Review, analysis and model building 
Gill and 
Butler, 1996 
       x  Qualitative Case study of 2 domestic (UK/UK) IJVs; interviews with 
senior managers plus archival data 
Glaister, 1995        x  Quantitative Mail questionnaire responses from senior managers of 65 
equity and 29 non-equity IJVs Western Europe, US and 
Japan partners. 
Goodall and 
Warner, 2002 
x   x x x  x  Qualitative/ 
quantitative 
Semi-structured interviews with Chinese board members 
from 36 Sino/foreign IJVs 
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Groot and 
Merchant, 
2000 
x x    x x   Qualitative Case study of 3 European (Dutch)/US/Japanese IJVs; 
interviews with IJVs’ and partners’ managers 
Hambrick et 
al, 2001  
x       x x Conceptual Review, analysis and model building 
Hoon-
Halbauer, 
1999 
        x Qualitative A longitudinal case study of 2 Sino/Foreign IJVs; 
interviews and observations with Chinese and expatriate 
employees occupying junior and senior managerial 
positions in the IJVs 
Kumar and 
Seth, 1998 
x  x       Quantitative Questionnaire/mail survey of 64 CEOs of US/US and 
US/Foreign IJVs 
Li et al., 1999         x Qualitative In-depth interviews with over 30 managers in a large 
number of IJVs in China 
Li et al, 2002         x Conceptual Based on preliminary field interviews 
Luo et al, 
2001  
  x       Quantitative Mail survey of CEOs of 295 IJVs in China 
Pearce, 1997         x Conceptual Review, analysis and model building 
Pearce, 2000         x Quantitative Mail survey/questionnaire of top executives at 75 
domestic (US/US) JVs  
Pearce, 2001         x Quantitative Mail survey/questionnaire of top executives at 75 
domestic (US/US) JVs  
Schaan, 1988   x   x    Qualitative 48 interviews with senior executives from 23 IJVs from 
North America, Mexico and Europe, and their parent 
companies 
Shenkar and 
Zeira, 1987 
       x  Conceptual Review, analysis and model building 
Shenkar and 
Zeira, 1992 
x        x Quantitative Mail questionnaire and interviews with CEOs of 44 IJVs 
between Israeli and European or American partners 
Wang and 
Satow, 1994 
        x Quantitative 151 questionnaires of interviews with top and middle 
managers from 72 Sino/Foreign companies, including 37 
Sino/Foreign IJVs  
Yan and Gray, 
1994 
x  x   x    Qualitative A comparative case study of 4 US/Chinese IJVs; 
interviews with executives of both partners and IJV 
managers plus archival data 
Yan and Gray, 
2001 
  x       Quantitative Questionnaire survey of top-level executives and senior 
managers from 90 US/China IJVs 
Zeira and 
Shenkar, 1990 
 x        Qualitative Interviews with the top managers (CEOs or senior vice 
presidents) in 120 IJVs world-wide 
Source: Compiled by the Authors 
  
IJV Board Roles 
 
In their study of corporate governance in Sino-foreign IJVs, Goodall and Warner (2002) 
indicate that board functions within Sino-foreign IJVs are influenced by a variety of 
demographic factors, such as, the age of the IJV; financial performance; number of Chinese 
and foreign partners; nationality of the foreign partner and the geographic location of the IJV. 
Similar to Bjorkman’s (1995) study of boards of directors in 33 Sino-Western IJVs, Goodall 
and Warner’s (2002) findings show that IJV board directors roles include dealing with new 
investment decisions, dividend distribution, approval of budgets, drawing up the IJV’s strategic 
plan, monitoring operating performance and pursuing appropriate corrective measures, 
maintaining/improving the relationship between the IJV partners, acting as facilitators over 
conflicts between the IJV partners and in making key staff appointments, such as general 
managers (GMs) and deputy GMs. 
 
Apart from Bjorkman’s (1995) and Goodall and Warner’s (2002) research, those few studies 
that focus on ownership and the control structure of IJVs only “partly” explore the IJV board’s 
role. One in particular is that of Yan and Gray’s (1994) study of bargaining power, 
management control and performance of the US-Chinese IJVs, where some attention is given 
to the importance of the role played by boards of directors in making strategic decisions on 
behalf of the IJV and solving critical problems regarding the partnership. They find that in 
most circumstances, boards of directors are empowered to discuss and take action on all 
fundamental issues concerning the joint venture. These include expansion projects, production 
and business programmes, the budget, distribution of profits, plans concerning manpower and 
pay scales, the termination of business, the appointment of the president, the vice-president(s), 
the chief engineer, the treasurer and the auditors, as well as board functions and powers and 
director remuneration (Yan and Gray, 1994:1493). 
 
Additionally, Groot and Merchant (2000) examine the control practices employed by the 
partners of IJVs and find that, in terms of IJV contracts, the board plays a significant action- 
and results-control role. Their action-control role involves either making or approving all major 
financing, investment and personnel decisions, whereas the results-control role involves 
monitoring their IJV’s performance on a regular basis and accordingly initiating change (Groot 
and Merchant, 2000). In one of the IJVs under their consideration, the primary function of the 
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board is to review and approve the strategic plan and annual budget, to approve all 
appointments of personnel to management positions, as well as all investment proposals. In 
another, in the IJV agreement, certain strategic decisions required unanimous IJV board 
agreement. 
 
In addition to approving the IJV’s business plan, profit distribution, major investments and 
other important financial decisions, the IJV board has been found to be a “major forum” for 
conflict resolution, decision-making, co-ordination of activities and strategic debate (Goodall 
and Warner, 2002). Accordingly, Hambrick et al (2001) maintain that IJV boards are a major 
conduit for relationship development and enhancement between the IJV, the TMT and their 
parent organisations. In Daniels and Magill’s (1993) study, IJV TMT members refer to the 
board of directors for policy and other key decisions, and are appraised by the IJV board 
members.  The authors (Daniels and Magill, 1993; Kumar and Seth, 1998) also recognise that a 
critical aspect of the role and contribution of the IJV board is to act as a communication and 
information-processing channel between the parents and the IJV or, as Shenkar and Zeira 
(1992:71) refer to the IJV boards central “buffering function”. 
 
IJV Board Composition  
 
Studies concerning IJV board composition broadly conclude that the percentage of equity 
ownership of the partners of the IJV is reflected in the appointment of directors (Chalos, 1998). 
In effect, a parent’s equity share directly affects representation on the IJV board in terms of the 
number of IJV directors the parent company is entitled to appoint relative to the total size of 
the board (Child and Yan, 1999). The contractual agreement specifies the IJV board’s structure 
particularly in terms of equity partner representation on the IJV board of directors (Zeira and 
Shenkar, 1990; Garrow et al, 2000). An exception is the board in one of the IJVs examined by 
Groot and Merchant (2000), where all but one member of the board were local IJV employees 
who did not represent either of the two parents. 
 
In their study of Australian-Indian IJVs, As-Saber et al (1998) highlight that in almost all the 
IJVs studied the CEOs were not members of the board of directors. The reason for this is the 
lack of incentive for CEOs to serve as board members due to Indian law regulations not 
permitting a full-time board member to hold a full-time management position in the company 
and to receive simultaneous compensation for both positions (As-Saber et al, 1998). What is 
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not clear, not only in As-Saber et al’s (1998) study but also in a number of other studies in the 
field, is whether the IJV board studied was a single or a two-tier board1. Regarding board size, 
Goodall and Warner’s (2002) study shows that the number of IJV board members varies 
considerably - the smallest board having four members and the largest having eleven. 
 
IJV Board Dynamics  
 
A number of factors influencing IJV board dynamics are considered, including decision 
making on the board particularly related to multiple task environments and decision making 
power, as well as factors important for board effectiveness – namely, openness of 
communication, quality of relationships, trust, shared vision and the effect of directors’ tenure 
on board and individual director performance. Frequency of meetings, board agendas and the 
impact of the national and organisational culture have also been scrutinised. 
 
Decision Making  
 
Decision-making on the board is identified as a complicated issue because of the conflicting 
expectations of at least three different task environments, the two partners and their IJV, which 
require synchronisation of different objectives, beliefs and attitudes towards the decision 
process (Shenkar and Zeira, 1987). Decision processes and director interventions can become 
dysfunctional if the IJV goals stated in the documents of incorporation are viewed as 
ambiguous (Shenkar and Zeira, 1987). Therefore, in examining decision making on IJV 
boards, multiple viewpoints need to be considered when formulating business policies and 
making strategic decisions.  The reason is that IJVs are influenced by the policies, value 
systems and managerial practices of their parent companies and problems may arise as a result 
of conflicting partner values regarding IJV goals and strategy. Factors that intensify the 
tensions inhibiting collaboration between IJV board members themselves and the IJV board 
and its parents are differences of working styles, values, attitudes and beliefs, which originate 
from the national and corporate cultures of the parent companies involved (Hoon-Halbauer, 
1999). Consequently, at IJV board level, differences in priorities and values emerge resulting in 
confusion, frustration and slowness of decision making  (Glaister, 1995:79). 
 
                                                          
1 For a detailed discussion on various corporate governance models, see Kakabadse and Kakabadse (2001). 
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Such tensions are exacerbated by the fact that the composition of the IJV board of directors has 
been utilised as one effective way of controlling the risks associated with opportunistic partner 
behaviour in the IJV and ensuring that all partner’s interests are being protected (Yan & Gray, 
1994; Luo et al, 2001). One approach to risk reduction lies in the power of IJV boards of 
directors to select the senior managers of the enterprise (Bjorkman, 1995; Wang et al., 1999; 
Bjorkman and Lu, 1999), an important consideration in terms of ensuring strategic control 
(Child and Yan, 1999). Equally, a number of authors concur that influencing the staffing of an 
IJV’s top management represents a crucial strategic control mechanism for an IJV parent, 
particularly in terms of staffing the IJV’s TMT by managers from the parent company (Schaan, 
1988; Geringer and Hebert, 1989; Geringer and Frayne, 1990; Kumar and Seth, 1998). 
However, on the positive side, directors and senior managers of the IJV are likely to be 
relatively well positioned to generate essential resources if they have prior experience and are 
networked into the parent company (Kumar and Seth, 1998:581). 
 
Other studies (Geringer, 1993; Goodall and Warner, 2002) emerge with contrasting 
conclusions especially over degrees of strategic influence and decision power and the fact that 
they are not simply a function of equity share. In a study of ownership and control in East-
West IJVs, Geringer (1993) found that having a majority on the board can be relatively 
unimportant, as in many instances major decisions of the IJV board tend to be reached through 
consensus. If a parent attempts to force its will upon its partners merely based on relative 
ownership, then the IJV’s prospects for long-term survival diminish (Geringer, 1993:209). 
Although the exercise of asymmetric power can enhance the more powerful parent’s IJV goal 
attainment, the less powerful parent can resent such unwelcome influence (Yan and Gray, 
1994; Li et al, 2002). As Yan and Gray (2001:409) state: “If decisions are made by the board 
of directors by simple majority rule, then inter-partner competitive motives will likely drive 
decisions that mirror the pattern of power distribution between the partners.” Further, control at 
board level is not simply a matter of votes but the ability to influence other board members on 
important issues (Schaan, 1988). As a result, studies have shown that minority partners have an 
opportunity to influence the management of the IJV if they are careful to appoint, as their 
board representatives, people with a strong grasp of the IJV’s strategic circumstances and who 
also have sound bargaining skills and empathy for the partner’s culture (Schaan, 1988). 
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Board Effectiveness and Director Tenure 
 
Viewed from a more “positive” perspective, it has been argued that inter-partner trust in the 
IJV will affect the quality of relationships between the partners and the perceived importance 
of the formal governance (control) structure (Yan and Luo, 2001). Gill and Butler (1996) argue 
that directors need to have attained personal trust between each other, as relying on 
“procedural” trust, based on the terms of the IJV contract, is not sufficient for enhancing 
successful inter-partner relations. Such a conclusion is particularly pertinent as studies 
emphasise that high levels of trust between the board of directors and the IJV CEO, 
accompanied by a sharing of values and vision for the future, are necessary prerequisites for 
the IJV to be effective (Garrow et al, 2000). Thus, positive inter-partner and continuity of 
board membership is found to be important in maintaining relationships and developing a 
shared vision between IJV board directors (Bjorkman, 1995; Goodall and Warner, 2002).  In 
terms of continuity, board tenure encouraging of team cohesion is identified as varying 
between two and five years (Pearce, 2000; Goodall and Warner, 2002). 
 
Frequency and Content of Board Meetings 
 
The frequency of board meetings and what could be viewed as a minimal required agenda is 
often not agreed upon by the partners in the first instance (Schaan, 1988). Research highlights 
“a tendency to overlook this most important opportunity to keep significant matters under 
appropriate review” (Schaan, 1988:7). Moreover, it has been found (Shenkar and Zeira, 1987) 
that parent companies tend to disagree not only on the desired extent of autonomy sought by 
IJVs but also on the frequency of participation of the foreign parents’ representatives on IJV 
board meetings. The majority of IJVs reported in Goodall and Warner’s (2002) study of 
corporate governance in Sino-foreign IJVs, were holding two board meetings per year.  Other 
authors (Daniels and Magill, 1993; Yan and Gray, 1994; Groot and Merchant, 2000) also found 
that the frequency of IJV board meetings varies between two and four times per year. For 
example, the board of directors of the four IJVs Yan and Gray (1994) studied met at least twice 
a year to set annual goals, review performance and approve operational plans for the venture. 
In two of the three IJVs studied by Groot and Merchant (2000), the IJV board met four times 
per year, and in the third, twice per year.  These findings indicate a less than average frequency 
for full board meetings amongst Anglo American enterprises which occur, on average, seven 
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times a year (Monks and Minnow, 1995).   Nevertheless, the interface between management in 
the partners’ headquarters and the IJV management, through the IJV board of directors, is 
reported by the parties concerned as being of crucial importance (Daniels and Magill, 1993). 
 
Yet such views have to be challenged, for as noted in the corporate governance literature, 
board members trust of each other’s expertise and judgement is critical and such trust is 
difficult to sustain on boards with low levels of interpersonal interaction (Forbes and Milliken, 
1999). This point is particularly clearly made in Rogers and Molnar’s (1976) study who cite 
that greater interaction amongst board director colleagues reduces perceptions of role 
ambiguity, an important consideration where the IJV board fulfils a crucial buffering function 
between parents and enterprise (Shenkar and Zeira, 1992:71). 
 
In terms of content, Groot and Merchant (2000:597) provide a description of a typical four-
hour board meeting, in one of the IJVs they studied, highlighting the following items; a one-
hour update on financial results, a short update on capital programmes; half-hour discussion on 
ongoing and proposed programmes regarding the distribution of IJV products through partner’s 
channels; short discussion on exchange rates and hedging plans, with the rest of the meeting on 
other strategic issues considered topical. Often studies conclude that comparable agenda items 
attract the attention of IJV board members, with the time allocated to such items varying 
according to contextual demands (Yan and Gray, 1994; Goodall and Warner, 2002). 
 
Impact of Culture 
 
The impact of national and organisational culture and the significance of the context in which 
the board is working are identified as important factors determining board effectiveness 
(Goodall and Warner, 2002). Bjorkman’s (1995) findings demonstrate one aspect of culture, 
namely, the importance of resolving contentious issues before Sino-foreign IJV board 
meetings. Nearly half the respondents in Goodall and Warner’s (2002) study noted that the 
partners would try to reach agreement on critical issues before board meetings. Any remaining 
contentious issues would be avoided during the meeting itself but then “picked up” later in 
informal discussions. Amongst certain national cultures, such as that of the Chinese, the 
importance of informal communication aimed at conflict avoidance at board meetings is a 
crucial consideration, thus allowing board meetings to formalise agreements already reached 
(Goodall and Warner, 2002). Accordingly, Goodall and Warner (2002) conclude that 
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membership of an IJV board in China is not simply a question of selection according to 
existing business skills but also taking account of cultural concerns in the selection and 
preparation of potential board members. In particular, cross-cultural training is identified as 
useful, as well as the selection of people with personalities “which will flourish in a 
relationship-based business environment” (Goodall and Warner, 2002:89). They suggest that 
IJV board members need to come to terms with radically different approaches to analysis and 
as such, need to learn to listen to each other in order to be aware of contrasting rationales on 
the board. 
 
IJV TOP TEAMS 
 
Given the importance of IJV TMT processes in determining the success of the IJV, it is striking 
that only a small number of studies concentrate on IJV TMTs, and their interrelationships  
(Hambrick et al, 2001). Yet, the studies reviewed examining IJV TMT processes (e.g., Pearce, 
1997; 2000; 2001; Hambrick et al, 2001) shed some light on the IJV directors’ role and 
contribution by highlighting the “special property of IJV TMTs that render the literature on 
TMTs and small groups incomplete” (Hambrick et al, 2001:1035). Namely, as members of an 
IJV, TMT members serve as representatives of their respective parent company, each of whom 
may have conflicting agendas. IJV TMT’s are expected to protect their own parent’s interests 
and, at the same time, focus on the IJV’s challenges, needs and pursuit of success (Pearce, 
2001). 
 
Overall, the literature on IJV boards and top teams shows that, despite the volume of research 
on IJVs and the evident importance of understanding board directors’ behaviour in IJVs, scant 
attention has been paid by researchers to IJV board functioning in terms of each individual 
board directors’ contribution to board effectiveness. Although the literature on IJV TMTs 
provides certain insight into the possible intensity and quality of directors’ interactions, almost 
no information has been provided on the flow of information between directors, levels of 
director consensus, processes of board evaluation and comprehensiveness and explicitness of 
board proceedings and action. It is for this reason that the next section examines the studies 
that directly focus on the IJV board director’s role in order to unearth empirical evidence that 
sheds light on IJV TMT processes and interactions. 
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IJV Board Director 
 
Garrow et al, (2000) have examined how people work effectively within alliances and IJVs, 
including the skills and behaviour necessary for effective contribution. Their report, based on a 
number of case studies conducted in IJVs and other alliances, highlights the nature and 
importance of the role that top executives play in an IJV form of organisation. Although they 
do not explicitly state which group of people they are referring to in using the term “alliance 
manager”, from their report it becomes clear that they refer to Chairman, CEO and other IJV 
board members/top executives. They found that, despite the fact that IJVs need clear goals and 
decision-making processes, there is a danger of “stifling the spirit” of an IJV with too much 
formalisation of processes and specifying of roles (Garrow et al, 2000:73). Garrow et al (2000) 
further identify that certain IJV board directors role model appropriate behaviour and skills in 
order to minimise political behaviour and promote sharing of information and ideas, thus 
encouraging a constant revaluation of strategic objectives. “Although the alliance manager may 
have been chosen from one of the parent companies, it is essential that he/she represents both 
parties impartially. This is a key part of building trust and forming the basis for the degree of 
integration necessary” (Garrow et al, 2000:35). Garrow et al (2000) also suggest that 
influencing, negotiating and persuading without exercising undue control is an essential 
requirement for an alliance manager, coupled with excellence in business acumen and strong 
interpersonal skills. Additional to identifying IJV directors’ skills, authors in the HRM field on 
IJVs (Schuler and Van Sluijs, 1992; Schuler, 2001) have also focused on the criteria for 
selection and appointment to IJV board/TMT positions. Even so, the majority of studies on 
senior roles in IJVs concentrate on examining the role of the person in charge of an IJV, 
namely, the CEO or IJV general manager (GM). Although the term “GM” is, in the majority of 
cases, used with reference to the person in charge of an IJV (the CEO), the terms “CEO” and 
“GM” have been adopted by different authors (e.g., Geringer and Frayne, 1990) to identify 
roles of similar or different managerial levels (Table 2). 
 
 
  Table 2: Select Literature on an IJV Board Director’s Role 
AUTHORS FOCUS/ AREAS  NATURE OF 
THE STUDY 
APPROACH 
 The Nature of the IJV 
Board Director’s Role 
The IJV Board 
Director’s Activities 
and Qualities 
Role of the IJV 
CEO/GM 
  
Frayne and Geringer, 1993   x Qualitative/ 
Quantitative 
Based on the results of the pilot study which included a questionnaire and 
interviews with 101 managers involved with 42 Canadian based JVs 
Garrow et al., 2000 x x  Qualitative Case studies of 9 strategic alliances, including 4 IJVs; interviews with 
executive and middle managers and employees  
Geringer and Frayne, 1990   x Conceptual Review, analysis and model building 
Geringer and Hebert, 1989   x Conceptual Review, analysis and model building 
Geringer and Hebert, 1991   x Quantitative Two related studies in the US and Canada, using questionnaires and semi-
structured interviews with GMs and executives from 69 and 48 IJVs 
respectively 
Geringer, 1993   x Conceptual Review, analysis and model building 
Gong et al, 2001   x Quantitative Survey of 265 CEOs in Sino/foreign IJVs 
Hoon-Halbauer, 1999   x Qualitative A longitudinal case study of 2 Sino/Foreign IJVs; a number of interviews and 
observations with Chinese and expatriate employees occupying junior and 
senior managerial positions in the IJVs  
Kumar and Seth, 1998  x  Quantitative Questionnaire/mail survey of 64 CEOs of US/US and US/Foreign IJVs 
Li et al., 1999   x Qualitative In-depth interviews with over 30 managers in a large number of IJVs in China 
Schaan, 1988   x Qualitative 48 interviews with senior executives from 23 IJVs from North America, 
Mexico and Europe, as well as from their parent companies 
Schuler, 2001 x x  Conceptual Review, analysis and model building 
Shenkar and Zeira, 1992 x x x Quantitative Mail questionnaire and interviews with CEOs of 44 IJVs between Israeli and 
European or American partners 
 Source: Compiled by the Authors 
 
  
Kumar and Seth (1998) provide empirical evidence regarding the activities that IJV board 
members perform as a part of their role in the control and co-ordination of IJVs. They 
distinguish between the internal and external roles of board members. The internal role 
corresponds to participation by IJV board members in strategic planning and performance 
monitoring processes, particularly in the following four areas: (1) participation in drawing up 
strategic plans; (2) approval of budgets and short-term plans; (3) monitoring operating 
performance; and (4) co-ordinating the IJV with the parents (Kumar and Seth, 1998:597). The 
external role of the IJV board members concerns involvement in facilitating legal and 
public/government relations on behalf of the IJV. Kumar and Seth (1998) conclude that with 
greater strategic interdependence between the IJV and its parents, both the internal and external 
role of the board members intensify. They also establish that, with increased environmental 
uncertainty, IJV board members pay greater attention to their external role and therefore have 
to reconcile the conflicting demands of their two sets of roles (Kumar and Seth, 1998). 
 
In his comprehensive review of the literature related to HR issues and activities in IJVs, 
Schuler (2001) provides a description of the role of the HR director on the IJV board. 
According to Schuler (2001), the HR director plays the dual role of attending to the needs and 
challenges facing the IJV whilst simultaneously being responsive to the objectives of both 
partners. To bridge such dualities, displaying capability in negotiation, communications and 
tolerance is essential. Extrapolating his findings to the role of IJV director, Schuler concludes 
that displaying concern for multiple sets of stakeholders, knowing how to work with partners to 
create a win-win situation and seeing the wisdom of mutual sharing over competing between 
the partners, are important capabilities (Schuler, 2001:44). Schuler (2001:29) summarises the 
critical selection criteria for IJV directors, which include: knowledge of the IJV business, 
parents’ strategy, structure and values; knowledge of the local culture, politics, laws, 
competitors; ability and willingness to learn and encourage transfer of learning; ability to 
negotiate; understanding of cultural differences; tolerance for conflict and ambiguity. Although 
this description provides insight concerning the performance expectation of an IJV board 
member, particularly that of the HR director, Schuler’s (2001) contribution is still conceptual 
and has yet to be tested empirically. Nevertheless, both Schuler’s (2001) and Kumar and Seth’s 
(1998) conclusions are useful in gaining an insight into the nature of an IJV board director’s 
role, the qualities IJV board members should bring to the boardroom and the activities they 
perform. 
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Role of an IJV CEO/GM 
 
It has been long recognised that the position of the IJV CEO/GM is critical for the effective 
management of the IJV, as this is the focal point for the maintenance of relationships with each 
of the parents, as well as the running of the IJV (Geringer, 1993; Frayne and Geringer, 1993). 
Particularly pertinent is the bridging function of attempting to reconcile differences between 
the parent companies, by gaining consensus about the IJV vision and presenting that vision to 
the board of each parent (Garrow et al, 2000). The influence and formal power of the IJV 
CEO/GM’s position is influenced by the governance (control) structure established by the 
parents (Geringer and Hebert, 1989:242). However, although the ability to appoint the IJV 
CEO/GM increases the chances that the parent’s interests will be observed, it is no guarantee 
that the CEO/GM will always accommodate that parent’s preferences (Schaan, 1988:14). The 
IJV CEO/GM is identified as being in the position of needing to accommodate the interests of 
all parents, each with different expectations, whilst finding a balance between the parents’ 
priorities and a compromise between their different sets of objectives (Hoon-Halbauer, 1999). 
Clearly, the IJV CEO/GM typically requires more extensive contact with each parent enterprise 
as well as a more explicit and detailed understanding and appreciation of each parent’s 
expectations, than might be the case for the executives of each of the parent companies 
(Geringer and Hebert, 1991:261). Accordingly, Li et al (1999) contend that the most important 
requirements for the IJV CEO/GM are his/her ability to express the vision, values and 
expectations of the IJV and to have diplomatic competence and skills in cross-cultural 
understanding and communication. 
 
In their discussion of the role of HR strategies as control mechanisms in IJVs, Geringer and 
Frayne (1990) identify the skills necessary for the IJV CEO/GM which are to inspire 
confidence, to motivate staff drawn from different business cultures and to satisfy the often-
divergent interests of the parents. Their study identifies that the main requirements for the IJV 
CEO/GM include having the personality, vision, leadership and networking skills to win the 
trust of critical stakeholders. Moreover, as is the case with a number of other authors that 
focused on the IJV CEO/GM role (Li et al, 1999), the tendency has been to focus on the more 
tangible outcomes of the role, at the expense of the actual processes (dynamic nature) entailed 
in fulfilling the role. 
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Shenkar and Zeira (1992) examine the organisational (the number of parent firms, ownership, 
parents’ dominance and objectives, cultural distance) and personal (length of service, 
education, autonomy) correlates of role conflict and role ambiguity that face IJV CEOs/GMs. 
They establish that an IJV CEO/GM is challenged by the simultaneous demands of the 
different policy makers in each parent company and of the various employee groups in the IJV, 
as well as the internal and external stakeholders in the host country and other countries in 
which the IJV conducts business, and is required to translate these different, ambiguous and 
conflicting expectations into workable strategies. In support, Garrow et al (2000) find that the 
IJV CEO/GM devotes considerable time reconciling parental differences, as well as taking care 
of alliance business. Gong et al (2001) also studied the role conflict and ambiguity of CEOs in 
Chinese-based IJVs and conclude that role conflict and ambiguity diminish when the contract 
between the parents is agreed and clear to all parties concerned. Whatever perspective is taken, 
all of these studies (Shenkar and Zeira, 1992; Garrow et al, 2000; Gong et al, 2001) emphasise 
the unique and dynamic role processes occurring within IJVs, due to the multiplicity of 
demands of substantial equity-sharing stakeholders operating within multiple environments. 
 
CONCLUSION  
 
The selected literature indicates that, despite an impressive array of research on different 
aspects of IJV operations, insufficient attention has been given to examining IJV board 
functioning and the roles played by board directors of IJVs. Apart from certain insights 
concerning what IJV directors do, what qualities they should display and the issues they are 
likely to encounter, little is known about the nature of their behaviour and contribution to IJV 
board effectiveness.  Consequently, no precise, testable propositions can be developed without 
further exploration of the issues raised in this paper. This review of the literature has revealed 
four major areas that would particularly benefit from future research, namely, an examination 
of, 
- the functioning of IJV boards; 
- IJV board dynamics and its impact on board effectiveness; 
- the role and contribution of individual directors on IJV boards; and 
- processes that effect, and are affected by, the IJV board director’s contribution to board 
effectiveness.  
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Of particular interest should be attention to issues such as, IJV directors understanding of IJV 
governance and different partners’ agendas, the implicit purpose of the IJV, as well as factors 
that influence director’s perceptions of their role and contribution, loyalty and their belief in 
the future of the IJV. Further research is needed in the areas of IJV board director’s 
responsibilities and how these impact on directors’ contribution to IJV board performance; how 
effective are the interpersonal relations between IJV board directors; IJV director’s personal 
links and sources of information which promote particular agenda/interests, “room for 
manoeuvre”, sensitivity to others and personal style; and director’s role pressures and 
ambiguities.  Particularly as their study has been confined to the CEOs of IJVs, Shenkar and 
Zeira (1992) suggest that future research should examine role conflict and ambiguity from the 
perspective of the various actors in the system, including all members of the IJV board of 
directors. 
 
In response to the limitations of previous empirical research in IJVs (Parkhe, 1993), it is further 
held that there is a need for studies to focus on theory building rather than theory testing.  
Qualitative case studies are particularly well suited to new research areas, or research areas for 
which existing theory seems inadequate (Eisenhardt, 1989; Ghauri et al, 1995). Additionally, 
qualitative approaches to IJV research allow for the development of new concepts by gaining 
deeper understanding of the phenomenon through becoming immersed in the context of IJVs. 
Finally, Goodall and Warner (2002) recommend that future research should attempt to gain 
access to IJV’s partners’ local and foreign board members in order to gain further insights 
concerning the challenges and ambiguities faced by IJV board members. 
 
In addition, the paper suggests the following implications for practitioners: 
- IJV board directors need to have clearer roles in order to reduce prospects of experiencing 
role conflict and/or role ambiguity;  
- A better understanding of numerous issues pertinent to decision making on IJV boards is 
vitally important to an IJV board director; 
- This understanding, coupled with developing and using particular personal qualities, should 
help individuals holding an IJV board director’s role contribute to a shared vision for the 
future of the IJV, encourage and promote clear and open communication in the boardroom, 
and enhance quality of relationships on the IJV board. 
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